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ABSTRACT
Historically security has developed as a discipline, separate from the original dependability
framework, which included reliability, availability and safety attributes. Therefore, the integra-
tion of security in this framework has not yet been fully accomplished. This paper presents a
novel approach to security, intended to facilitate and improve this integration. This is achieved
by taking a dependability viewpoint on traditional security and interpreting it in behavioural
and preventive terms. A modified security concept, comprising only preventive characteristics
is defined where confidentiality is suggested to be a behavioural dependability attribute. The
outcome of this interpretation influences the integration of the other three dependability
attributes. The overall objective of this approach is to arrive at a more general and clear-cut
dependability framework, that would describe how (un)dependable a system is, irrespective of
the reason for the (un)dependability. For example, it should be possible to treat a system failure
due to an intentional intrusion or due to a hardware fault using the same methods and in paral-
lel. Finally, the problem of interpreting concepts and terminology for security impairments in
dependability terms is addressed, based on a few examples from real security breaches. It is
realized that this is an area where future work is necessary.
Keywords: Security, Dependability, Vulnerability, Computers, Modelling, Terminology.
21 INTRODUCTION
The research field of security and dependability are two disciplines that describe important
properties of computer systems. Security has emerged from the viewpoint of unauthorized
interaction with a system, leading to disclosure or modification of information. Dependability
has evolved from reliability and availability considerations. Security and dependability have
traditionally been treated separately. Lately however, attempts have been made to integrate
these two, e.g as suggested in [Laprie1992], where dependability is defined as an “umbrella”
concept of which security is just an attribute among others. However, the consequences of this
proposed integration have not yet been fully assessed. What we are facing here is the classical
problem of two successful disciplines that are both evolving, resulting in a situation where an
overlap occurs. Advocates for each discipline tend to incorporate the “other” into their “own”
one without fully realizing the consequences that such an integration would entail. The incor-
poration of security as a dependability attribute has already been mentioned. Similar attempts
can be found within the security community [Denning1989].
Another point of concern is that the concepts overlap and that each discipline uses a terminol-
ogy that is often incompatible with that of the other discipline. The most striking example of
overlap is availability. From the security viewpoint it describes the possible disruption of ser-
vice delivery to the authorized user as a result of intentional interaction. However, from the
reliability viewpoint the possible service disruption is normally due to a component failure,
even if no restriction with respect to the cause is really made.
This paper attempts to improve this situation by taking a dependability viewpoint on tradi-
tional security and interpreting it in behavioural and preventive terms, with the intention to
arrive at a unified dependability framework [Jonsson and Olovsson 1992]. We shall use the
term dependability for the overall trustworthiness of the system, i.e. a concept that reflects the
system’s adherence to the specification of the system. Here, the specification is the comprehen-
sive document that defines the behaviour of the system in a certain environment. For the pur-
pose of this discussion we shall make the unrealistic assumption that the specification exists
and is complete. The behaviour of the system is understood as the service delivered to its
user(s), whether authorized or unauthorized, and it is directly related to the output of the sys-
tem. The environment also gives the input conditions under which the system is designed to
operate. If the environment behaves as specified and the system operates correctly, the service
delivered by the system will be correct and failure-free. The system is then dependable.
An illustration of a discrepancy in terminology is that in the dependability discipline reasons
for failures are called faults, whereas security people talk about attacks that cause breaches.
Whether these terms correspond directly is not clear, even if the similarity is evident. Many
questions of this type could be posed. What are the relations between e.g. fault, attack, flaw,
error, bug, vulnerability, defect? Do some of these terms represent identical concepts? Should
we in that case look for unification of terminology, or is it justifiable to maintain separate ter-
minologies for each discipline? These are questions which need to be answered as integration
work proceeds, and even though a full answer will not be given in this paper, the suggestions
made is hoped to facilitate further work in this direction.
In the following section 2 gives the traditional viewpoint of dependability and security and
section 3 describes the terminology for dependability impairments. In section 4 a novel
approach to integrate security and dependability is suggested. Section 5 briefly discusses the
terminology for security impairments followed by a few examples in section 6.
32 TRADITIONAL DEPENDABILITY AND SECURITY CONCEPTS
Dependability was first introduced as an extension of reliability and availability and these
were then reduced to be specific attributes of dependability together with safety and security
[Laprie1985]. Reliability and availability constitute different views of a basic concept that
deals with the delivery of service. Here, service is the system behaviour as perceived by its
users [Laprie1992]. Reliability is a characteristic that reflects the probability that the system
will deliver its service under specified conditions for a stated period of time, whereas availabil-
ity reflects the probability that the system will be available, or ready for use, at a certain instant
in time. Safety is also related to the service delivered by the system, but rather than character-
izing the system during operation, it denotes the system’s ability to fail in such a way that cat-
astrophic consequences are avoided. Safety is reliability with respect to catastrophic failures.
Security was incorporated as the fourth dependability attribute. It refers to the system’s ability
to prevent unauthorized access or handling of information, and to its ability to withstand illegal
interaction or attacks against system assets such as data, hardware or software. This notion of
security normally assumes a hostile action from a person, the attacker, who often tries to gain
some kind of personal benefit from his actions. Security is normally defined by three different
aspects: confidentiality, integrity and availability [Hsaio1988], [ITSEC1991], [Laprie1992],
[Laprie1992b], [Pfleeger1989].
Confidentiality, which is also called secrecy, is the ability of the computing system to prevent
disclosure of information to unauthorized parties. Integrity, sometimes called accuracy, is the
ability of the computer system to prevent data or other assets from being modified, deleted or
destroyed by an unauthorized party. Finally, availability, is the system’s ability to deliver its
normal service to the authorized user, even in the presence of attacks. It should be noted that
availability is found in two places in the present dependability model, both as a direct attribute
to dependability and as one of the security aspects.
Various versions of the definition of security exist. See e.g. [ISO7498], [Garfinkel and
Spafford1991], [Muftic1989]. In database systems integrity refers to actions taken by an autho-
rized party and to the accuracy and validity of data, whereas security refers to protection of data
against unauthorized interaction [Date1990].
3 TRADITIONAL DEPENDABILITY IMPAIRMENTS
3.1 Background
The discussion in this paragraph is primarily based on the ideas presented in [Jonsson 1993].
A model of a dependable system contains at least two components. The first is the object system
(or system only) for dependability assessment, in the following denoted SYS. The second com-
ponent is the environment consisting of a number of environmental subsystems.
 Consider a specific system as depicted in the block diagram in figure 1 in which a circle
denotes a state, an arrow an event and a square a (sub)system. The block diagram describes
the dependability impairments we are going to discuss. The environment interacts with the
SYS by generating inputs to it and by receiving outputs from it.
The discussion in this section starts out from the observation that a failure is normally pre-
ceded by a chain of events that leads to that failure. These events and their intermediate effects
on the system are called impairments.
43.2 Threat
In theory, all subsystems in the environment may interact with the SYS. This interaction may
be intentional in the sense that the subsystem is functionally connected to the SYS. The inter-
action may also be unintentional, reflecting no functional relationship. The interaction, whether
intentional or unintentional, may result in undesired effects in the SYS. From this viewpoint
the environmental subsystem represents a threat to the dependability of the SYS, thus the def-
inition:
Definition:
A dependability threat is an environmental subsystem, that can possibly lead to an error or a
vulnerability in the system.
The notion of threat has normally been linked to intentional faults and the security attribute.
The above definition is much wider. Any subsystem in the environment may constitute a
dependability threat.
3.3 Fault
A fault that can be related to a threat is called an external fault, since the source of the fault
is found outside the SYS. Internal faults are faults that arise (apparently) spontaneously some-
where in the system, i.e. with no detectable relation to a threat. The following definition of fault
covers both cases:
Definition:
A fault is an event leading to an error in the system.
 A fault is an event or system state change and is regarded as an atomic phenomenon. Thus, a
fault is never permanent but an inherently transient phenomenon. Neither is a fault intermittent.
An “intermittent fault” is regarded as a number of repeated transient incidents. The fault is the
direct reason for the error occurrence in the system and will unavoidably lead to an error.
3.4 Error
Definition:
An error is a system state that may lead to a system failure during normal system operation.
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5Since this definition is very general and intended to be applicable to many different types of
systems, the word state has to be understood in a broad sense. Thus we will avoid giving an
exact definition or interpretation of the word that would be valid for all cases. Once an error
has occurred in the system, the system is erroneous. The error may propagate to the system
boundary, and lead to a failure.
3.5 Failure and failed state
Definition:
A failure is the event when a deviation first occurs between the service delivered by the system
and the expected service, as defined in the system specification.
A failure or failure transition is an event that represents a state-change of the total system with
respect to the service it delivers. Before the failure occurs, the service delivered by the system
is correct and in accordance with the specification. After the failure, the service deviates from
what is specified. Thus the following definition applies:
Definition:
A system that exhibits a deviation between the delivered service and the specified service, is
said to be in a failed state.
A fault will lead to an error by definition. The resulting error may or may not start propagating
depending on the operational circumstances, error propagation. Therefore, an error may not
necessarily lead to a failure, and even if it does, the failure may manifest itself only after a con-
siderable delay. The fundamental observation here is that it is not until a failure has occurred
that any harm is done as seen from the user. As a consequence, a fault or an error will not affect
the dependability of the system if it never leads to a failure. Thus a system may be subjected
to faults and contain errors and still be completely dependable.
It should be noted that the error propagation model is not always applicable. This is especially
so in some collapsed cases, where the failure emerges virtually directly, with no significant
delay from the fault event. It may even be hard to define or distinguish the corresponding fault
and error(s). Typical examples are failures that are the result of violent action towards hard-
ware, e.g. crashing the screen, but also many of the confidentiality failures, such as the over-
hearing of a message, whether acoustic, visual or electronic.
3.6 Vulnerability
The critical points for a dependable system are the places where faults are injected, which for
external faults is at the boundary between the environment and the SYS. The environment
contains the dependability threats, whose behaviour represent a risk for fault injection into the
SYS. This risk can never be completely eliminated, and there will always be a remaining
probability for external fault injection into the system. This is the reason why it is worthwhile
to improve the system in such a way that it can better withstand the threats. This is the same
thing as to reduce the probability that a dependability threat creates a fault. Here we need to
define the term vulnerability:
Definition:
A vulnerability is a place where the probability for fault injection exceeds a predefined
threshold.
The vulnerability (deficiency, weakness, flaw) concept is well-known from the security
domain. A security attack may be aimed at planting a vulnerability in the system, a vulnerabil-
ity that can later be exploited by further successful attacks to cause loss or harm. The term
vulnerability is also applicable for non-intentional interaction. For example, a hardware vul-
nerability could typically be an unshielded cable, which is inclined to pick up external noise.
6The significant difference between a vulnerability and an error is that an error will propagate
under normal operating conditions when the erroneous part of the SYS is activated (used).
Vulnerabilities will not propagate during normal operation but only function as a channel for
external faults into the system.
4 INTEGRATING SECURITY AND DEPENDABILITY ATTRIBUTES
4.1 Background
We now ask ourselves how the traditional security concept could be readily integrated with
reliability/availability. The three security aspects, confidentiality, integrity and availability are,
according to [ITSEC1991], given a preventive definition: the prevention of unauthorized dis-
closure, modification and withholding respectively, i.e. related to the prevention of faults from
being introduced into the system. We shall see in the following that by means of giving them
a behavioural meaning, i.e. related to the behaviour of the system, or preventive meaning they
are, to a large extent, already covered by existing concepts in the dependability discipline.
A closer look closer at the system behaviour shows that we need to distinguish between two
different receivers of the output delivered by the system: the authorized user and the unautho-
rized user. See figure 2. The authorized users are the users that are the intended receivers of the
service that the system delivers, as specified in the system specification. In the following we
shall call the authorized user(s) the User. A user is any system in the environment that is a
potential consumer of the output delivered by the system. It may be human or object: a person,
a computer, a program etc. All potential users except the authorized users are unauthorized
users. Unauthorized users, or authorized users who are abusing their authority are called Non-
users. For a more detailed discussion please refer to [Jonsson and Olovsson 1992].
4.2 Availability
In traditional security availability is defined as the unauthorized withholding of information
and resources. The traditional dependability interpretation is: readiness for usage, i.e., the abil-
ity of the system to deliver its service to the User. Therefore, availability could in both cases
be regarded as a behavioural concept, denoting the extent to which system service is available
to the User. See figure 2.
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74.3 Integrity
Integrity is the prevention of unauthorized modification, deletion or destruction of system
assets. Integrity is violated by means of an attack, performed by a Non-user. Thus, integrity is
a preventive quality of a system and characterizes the system’s ability to withstand certain type
of attacks. Therefore, integrity is one specific type of dependability fault prevention.
4.4 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the ability of the system to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information
(for IT systems). It also includes unauthorized use of system assets and resources. Thus, con-
fidentiality means restricting the availability of the service delivered by the system to the Non-
users. It is thus a behavioural concept which defines certain characteristics of the system behav-
iour, but unlike availability attribute it defines system behaviour with respect to a Non-user. It
actually defines to what extent information and other assets should be accessible, or rather not
accessible, to Non-users. With this interpretation confidentiality can be regarded as a new
behavioural attribute in the dependability discipline.
4.5 Security
In view of the discussion in the previous sections we suggest a modified definition of the secu-
rity concept, so that security is simply regarded as prevention with respect to the introduction
of intentional faults or intentional vulnerabilities. Thus, security is a purely preventive concept,
which is not at all related to the behaviour of the system but only to its ability to protect itself
against certain types of faults and attacks. This is a rather restricted interpretation of security
and one could discuss whether there would be some more appropriate word to use for this con-
cept. We will, however, use the term security in this paper. Consequently, security mechanisms
are fault prevention mechanisms.
Recently, there has been some attempts to find quantitative measures for security in this fault
preventive interpretation. See [Olovsson and Jonsson1994], [Brocklehurst et al 1994] and ref-
erences therein. In these, it is suggested that the effort expended by an attacker to make a secu-
rity breach could be used as a measure of the security of the system. The basic idea is that the
more effort an attacker has to use to accomplish a security breach, in a statistical sense, the
more secure the system is. Thus, the effort parameter would reflect the system’s degree of secu-
rity, i.e., its fault prevention ability with respect to intentional faults.
4.6 Modified dependability attributes
The discussion in the preceding subsections suggested that confidentiality should be treated
as a separate dependability attribute that would describe the relation of the system to the Non-
user. Reliability and availability, on the other hand, are both attributes describing the relation
of the system to the User. They could therefore be regarded as views on the same composite
attribute: reliability/availability.
Where does that leave safety? Following the proposed terminology safety must be regarded
as a “sub-attribute” to either one of reliability/availability or confidentiality. Therefore,
dependability can be understood in terms of only two attributes: reliability/availability (related
to the User) and confidentiality (related to the Non-user), leaving safety to describe certain
types of failures, i.e. catastrophic failures, for both of these. See figure 3.
8The modified definitions of dependability and its attributes can be summarized as follows:
reliability/availability: refers to the system’s ability of delivery-of-service to the autho-
rized users, called Users.
confidentiality: refers to the system’s ability of denial-of-service to unauthorized users,
called Non-users. All users but those explicitly specified as authorized users are Non-us-
ers.
safety: refers to the system’s ability to avoid unintended catastrophic consequences, wheth-
er due reliability failures or to confidentiality failures. These consequences may affect
the environment, including Users and Non-users or the system itself.
dependability: is the trustworthiness of a computer system such that reliance can be justi-
fiably placed on the service it delivers to its Users, on the confidentiality it maintains with
respect to its Non-users and on the absence of unintended catastrophic consequences.
In the definition of safety, the word “unintended” is included since many systems are inten-
tionally constructed to cause catastrophic consequences on the environment, an obvious exam-
ple being warheads.
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95 SECURITY IMPAIRMENTS
In view of the behavioural system model discussed in section 4 and the suggested integration
of security and dependability attributes, we shall in this section suggest definitions and/or inter-
pretations of security impairments from a dependability viewpoint. As we shall see, system
impairments due to security violations can in many cases be directly interpreted in dependabil-
ity terms, e.g as fault - error - failure and vulnerability. However, in some cases this interpre-
tation is not evident, and it is quite clear that there are some problems in this context that need
to be further addressed. It shall also be pointed out that the definition of system boundaries can
pose some problems, especially when defining the boundaries between the attacker and the
user.
Threat
The security threat concept agrees with that of dependability. It is a subsystem in the environ-
ment that interacts with the object system that can possibly create a fault or create a vulnera-
bility in the system.
Attack
An attack is an attempt to perform a breach in the system.
Breach
A breach is an event that creates an error in the system, i.e., an intentional fault, or an event
that creates a vulnerability in the system. It is the result of a successful attack. A breach nor-
mally represents a violation of the (system) security policy.
Error
An error can be the result of a breach or of a “normal” fault, i.e., a fault that is not due to some
intentional human interaction. In the first case we refer to the error as a “security” error and in
the latter as a “reliability” error.
Failure
A failure that occurs is the result of a “security” error or “reliability” error that has propagated
to the system boundary. We refer to these failure as a “security” failures or as “reliability” fail-
ures.
6 EXAMPLES
6.1 Background
The previous discussion was aimed to show the difference between the behavioural and pre-
ventive view of the system and its attributes and to distinguish between faults and failures. In
particular it was suggested that security is purely preventive, i.e., related to faults and vulnera-
bilities and that the behavioural attributes of dependability are reliability/availability and con-
fidentiality. In this section we shall give a few examples of some security attacks and discuss
those and their consequences from a dependability viewpoint. We also show how security
faults can lead to reliability as well as confidentiality failures. Some of the examples are taken
from a security intrusion experiment that was performed at the department of Computer Engi-
neering at Chalmers University of Technology [Olovsson and Jonsson1994].
10
6.2 Security fault leads to reliability failure
The “kbd_mode” command is intended to reset the keyboard of a Sun UNIX-system to a well-
defined state. However, it has turned out that it is possible to execute the command remotely
on another machine, in which case the keyboard of that machine gets locked, i.e., it becomes
unavailable to the User.
The fact that the execution of the command leads to something else than intended, is an error
in the software, since it could be expected that executing a command remotely should lead to
the same result as executing it locally, or, if not leading to the same result, should be disre-
garded by the system. Therefore, the programmer has made a fault in the design process that
lead to this error. The error is activated by the attacker, who makes it propagate to cause a reli-
ability failure, so that the User can no longer use his machine.
It is also quite clear that a pure hardware (component) fault, which is not a security issue,
could lead to very same result, i.e. a disabling of the User keyboard.
6.3 Reliability fault leads to confidentiality failure
It is quite obvious that “normal” hardware or software faults can lead to confidentiality fail-
ures, e.g., an erroneous authorization program could lead to leakage of information to a Non-
user, or a pure hardware fault entail that an intended encryption of a message did not occur.
6.4 Trojan Horse
A User has left his login file world readable and writable. This vulnerability can be exploited
by an attacker to plant a Trojan Horse. The Trojan Horse is activated for a certain set of condi-
tions, that could e.g. involve time, certain actions by the User etc. The planted Trojan Horse is
an error in the system, since it will be activated during normal operation. When the conditions
are fulfilled the Trojan Horse will be activated and perform its task. This task may be deleting
all the User’s files on the hard disk, which is a reliability failure.
Another example would be if the Trojan Horse was activated when the User sent email to a
certain receiver. The action in this case could be copying the email to the Non-user, which is a
confidentiality failure.
7 CONCLUSIONS
A novel approach to the integration of security and dependability has been proposed. It is
based on the observation that the dependability of a computer system could be described in
behavioural and preventive terms. A behavioural viewpoint is related to the behaviour of the
system, i.e. to how the system influences its environment. A preventive viewpoint describes
the measures to be taken to prevent faults from being introduced into the system, i.e. how to
prevent unwanted environmental influence on the system.
Using this approach, we have shown how the various aspects of traditional security could
either be mapped onto existing dependability concepts or be understood as a new dependability
attribute, which we call confidentiality. Confidentiality is different from the traditional depend-
ability attributes in that it describes the system’s relation to an unauthorized user and not to the
authorized user. Safety describes the system’s ability to avoid catastrophic failures whether
reliability or confidentiality failures. Security is redefined as a concept for fault prevention with
respect to intentional external faults or attacks against the system. In this way (preventive)
security has no direct relation to behavioural attributes confidentiality and reliability/availabil-
ity.
11
8 REFERENCES
[Anderson1989] T. Anderson (editor): Safe & Secure Computing Systems, Blackwell Scien-
tific Publications, ISBN 0-632-01819-4, 1989.
[Baker1991] R. H. Baker: Computer Security Handbook, 2nd Edition, TAB Professional and
Reference Books, McGraw-Hill Inc, ISBN 0-8306-7592-2, 1991.
[Brocklehurst et al 1994] S. Brocklehurst, B. Littlewood, T. Olovsson, E. Jonsson: “On
measurement of Operational Security”, pp. 257-266 in Proceeding of the Ninth Annual
IEEE Conference on Computer Assurance, COMPASS’94, Gaithersburg, Maryland,
USA, June 29 -July 1, 1994.
[Date1990] C. J. Date: An Introduction to Database Systems, vol. 1, 5th edition, pp. 429ff.
Addison-Wesley 1990, ISBN 0-201-51381-1.
[Denning1989] D.E. Denning: “Secure Databases and Safety: Some unexpected conflicts,”
pp. 101-111 in T. Anderson (editor): Safe & Secure Computing Systems, Blackwell Sci-
entific Publications, ISBN 0-632-01819-4, 1989.
[DOD1983] Department of Defence: Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (“orange
book”), CSC-STD-001-83.
[Garfinkel and Spafford1991] S.Garfinkel, G.Spafford: “Practical UNIX Security”, p. 11ff,
O’Reilly and Associates Inc., ISBN 0-937175-72-2, 1991.
[Hsaio1988] D. K. Hsiao: “Database Security Course Module,” pp. 269-301 in Database Se-
curity: Status and Prospects, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V, Holland, IFIP WG 11.3,
ISBN 0-444- 70479-5, 1988
[ITSEC1991] Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC): Provisional
Harmonized Criteria, December 1993. ISBN 92-826-7024-4.
[ITSEM1993] Information Technology Security Evaluation Manual (ITSEM): Provision-
al Harmonized Methodology, September 1993. ISBN 92-826-7087-2.
[ISO1983] International Standards Organization: Data Processing - Open Systems Inter-
connection - Basic Reference Model, ISO/IS 7498, Geneva 1983.
[ISO7498] International Standards Organization: Information processing systems - Open
Systems Interconnection - Basic Reference Model, part 2: Security Architecture 7498/2.
[Jonsson and Olovsson 1992] E. Jonsson, T. Olovsson, “On the Integration of Security and
Dependability in Computer Systems”, IASTED International Conference on Reliability,
Quality Control and Risk Assessment, Washington, Nov. 4-6, 1992. ISBN 0-88986-171-
4, pp. 93-97
[Jonsson 1993] E. Jonsson, “A Unified Approach to Dependability Impairments in Computer
Systems”, IASTED International Conference on Reliability, Quality Control and Risk
Assessment, Cambridge, MA, Oct. 18-20 1993, ISBN 0-88986-181-1, pp. 173-178.
[Joseph1991] M.K. Joseph: “Integration problems in Fault-tolerant, secure computer de-
sign,” pp. 347-364 in A.Avizienis. J.C. Laprie (editors): Dependable Computing for
Critical Applications, Springer-Verlag, N.Y., ISBN 3-211-82249-6, 1991.
[Laprie1985] J.C. Laprie: “Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance: Concepts and Ter-
minology,” in Proc. 15th IEEE International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing
(FTCS-15), June 1985.
[Laprie1992] J.C. Laprie et al.: Dependability: Basic Concepts and Terminology, Springer-
Verlag, ISBN 3-211-82296-8, 1992.
12
[Laprie1992b] J.C. Laprie: Dependability: a unifying concept for reliable, safe secure com-
puting, Proc. of 12th IFIP World Computer Congress Madrid, Spain, September 1992,
vol. 1, pp. 585-593.
[Louw1992] E. Louw, N. Duffy, “Managing computer viruses”, Oxford University Press,
ISBN 0-19-853973-8, 1992.
[Muftic1989] S. Muftic: Security Mechanisms for Computer Networks, Ellis Horwood Ltd,
England, ISBN 0-7458-0613-9, 1989.
[Nessett1986] D. M. Nessett: “Factors Affecting Distributed System Security,” IEEE Symp.
on Security & Privacy, 1986, pp. 204 - 222.
[Olovsson and Jonsson1994] T. Olovsson, E. Jonsson, S. Brocklehurst, B. Littlewood:
Investigation of Quantitative Assessment of Operational Security Based on Intrusion
Experiments, Technical Report No 192, Department of Computer Engineering, Chalm-
ers and Compendium from the Nordic Seminar on Dependable Computing Systems 1994
(NSDCS’94), Lyngby, Denmark, Aug. 24-26, 1994.
[Pfleeger1989] C. P. Pfleeger: Security In Computing, Prentice Hall International, Inc. ISBN
0-13-799016-2, 1989.
13
